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Abstract 
 
 Putnam’s theory of “two-level games” has spawned numerous studies examining 
the interaction between international and domestic politics, many focusing on politics in 
the European Union. While noting that ratification may be formal or informal, much of 
this literature treats each important domestic actor as if it has de facto formal ratification 
power. This means that the literature overlooks the very real distinction between formal 
and informal ratification. Informal ratification may be thought of as a case in which the 
government pays “audience costs” for unpopular international agreements. In this case, a 
government must respond continuously to public opinion. This presents constraints very 
different from those faced by governments who must obtain the formal approval of the 
legislature (or other actor). For example, divided government has no effect on the 
likelihood of informal ratification but often does affect the distribution of gains, while it 
often affects the likelihood of formal ratification but often has no effect on the 
distribution of the gains. Because these kinds of ratification differ significantly, Putnam’s 
ratification metaphor is not always the most appropriate conceptualization of two-level 
politics in the European Union. The formal ratification metaphor is especially 
inappropriate for studying policy-making in the second and third pillars of the EU, which 
are mostly characterized by intergovernmental bargaining without formal ratification 
requirements. 
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 Though its many stops and starts, the process of European integration has clearly 
depended on the relationships between different institutions and groups within the 
European polity. The European Commission, and to a lesser extent the national 
governments, serves as the motor force for European integration. National publics, and to 
a lesser extent the legislatures, serve as the brakes. In short, certain elites negotiate 
proposals for further integration subject to constraints placed on them by other actors.  
 Though we have a growing formal literature on policy-making in the European 
Union (Crombez 1996, 1997, 2002; Moser 1996; Tsebelis 1994, 1996; Tsebelis and 
Garret 2000) this literature has emphasized the relations between the Commission, 
Council, and Parliament instead of intergovernmental bargaining. Though these bodies 
play central roles in the economic union, intergovernmental bargaining remains important 
in the European Union, especially for policies in the second and third pillars (foreign and 
security policy, and justice and home affairs, respectively) As the name suggests, 
intergovernmental bargaining also dominates the intermittent intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs), as well as accession negotiations and negotiation in successive 
rounds of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 Our theoretical understanding of these intergovernmental processes is 
unnecessarily limited. The dominant approach is heavily influenced by Robert Putnam’s 
metaphor of “two-level games.” Putnam conceptualized international cooperation as 
carried out by a country’s executives, who played one “game” with their foreign 
counterparts and a second game with domestic political actors at home. His framework 
highlighted the interaction between domestic and international politics within a 
theoretically-manageable framework, and it sparked a very fruitful research agenda 
studying both the United States and the European Union.  
 Subsequent research has tended to bifurcate into a formal literature limited to the 
problem of domestic ratification of treaties (without amendment) and a nonformal 
literature in which all other processes other than formal ratification is labeled “informal 
ratification” and then treated as conceptually similar to the formal variant. Each literature 
has made progress on its piece of the problem. Yet, clearly there is room for 
formalization of other types of domestic political settings, both to expand the formal 
literature and to add rigor to the nonformal analysis of some recurring of some recurring 
types of political interactions. 
 This paper develops a way to characterize some informal ratification games 
formally, especially those in which domestic public opinion provides the major constraint 
on the executive’s actions. By adding the effects of domestic audiences, I go beyond 
existing intergovernmental approaches that focus solely on governmental preferences (i.e. 
Hosli 1993, 1995, 1996; Moravcsik 1991, 1998). I begin with the well-understood formal 
ratification problem and then show how informal ratification differs from the standard 
formal ratification game. The analysis leaves out some other types of domestic political 
constraints, such as no-confidence votes, elections, and imperfect implementation, but it 
still suffices to capture a wide-range of two-level problems.  
 With formal ratification, the executive’s task centers on making the ratifer prefer 
an agreement to the status quo. The ratifier’s choice is dichotomous, the decision whether 
to ratify the agreement or not. This dichotomous choice produces an environment in 
which the ratifier’s preferences have dichotomous effects: sometimes they constrain and 
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sometimes they do not. Once the ratifier is satisfied, the executive does not need to make 
further concessions to it.  
 In contrast, informal ratification provides a continuous constraint on the 
executive. While the executive can pursue her own preferences, she must always “tack” 
in the direction of public opinion. Depending upon how much she values public opinion, 
this informal ratification may cause a larger or smaller change in agreements that an 
executive negotiates. However, the public is never completely satisfied and can never 
simply be ignored as some formal ratifiers can be.  
 In short, the implications of domestic opposition to any EU policy will depend, 
systematically and predictably, on whether ratification is formal or informal. For 
example, the informal ratification game has a smaller core than the formal ratification 
game. This may imply less policy gridlock in the informal setting than in the formal. The 
informal ratification game also means that the preferences of domestic actors have 
continuous effects, while they have discontinuous effects in a formal ratification game. 
Because of how preferences affect outcomes, divided government also has different 
effects in the two games. Divided government affect only the distribution of gains from 
cooperation in the informal ratification game. Understanding the role of democratic 
governance in the European Union, as well as evaluating any democratic deficit, requires 
examining both formal and informal processes. 
 
Formal models, two-level games, and the European Union 
 
The past decade has seen the growth of a family of models of EU decision-
making (i.e. Crombez 1996, 1997, 2002; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Moser 1996ab, Pahre 
1995, 1997, 2001; Schneider 1993, 2000; Schneider and Cedermann 1994, 1996, 1999; 
Tsebelis and Garett 2000). These have focused overwhelmingly on the formal legislative 
procedures of the EU, especially the cooperation and codecision procedures, or on the 
problem of domestic ratification of EU decision.  
 Important as these processes are, many important parts of EU decision-
making remain intergovernmental. Periodic IGCs are by definition intergovernmental. 
Joint decisions and joint positions taken under the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
are reached through intergovernmental negotiations, as are decisions taken under 
unanimity rules of the third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs). Raching common positions 
and negotiating with outsiders are also largely intergovernmental, as in the case of 
accession and association treaties or negotiations in the World Trade Organization. The 
leading models of these processes are Madeleine Hosli’s (1993, 1995, 1996) models of 
weighted voting under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). Valuable as they are, they 
downplay the actual policy dimensions at stake (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996), and neglect 
the role of domestic politics in the negotiating states.  
To examine the problem of how domestic ratification affects intergovernmental 
policy making, I will join many others in using a spatial model of two-level games. 
Robert Putnam (1988) developed his theory of two-level games at a time when many 
scholars were dissatisfied with the sterile distinction between the international and 
domestic levels of analysis (for contemporaneous efforts, see Ikenberry et al. 1988; 
Mastanduno et al. 1989; Haggard 1990; for a review, see Moravcsik 1992) Putnam’s 
metaphor proved the most popular for a variety of reasons, and soon sparked a large 
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literature studying many countries, mostly but not entirely in the developed world 
(Barnett 1990; Avery, ed. 1993; Evans et al., eds. 1993; Friman 1993, Hammond and 
Prins 1998, 1999; Iida 1993, 1996; Lehman and McCoy 1992, Li 1994; Lohmann 1992; 
Mayer 1992; McGinnis and Williams 1993; Meunier 2000; Milner 1997; Milner and 
Rosendorff 1996, 1997; Mo 1994, 1995; Pahre 1997, 2001; Putnam and Bayne 1987; 
Putnam and Hennig 1986; Smith 1998; Schoppa 1993; Solingen 1993; Tarar 2001). The 
fact that Putnam had used a simple version of spatial theory in explicating his framework 
also proved influential, and has shaped much of the subsequent research in both the 
formal and non-formal literatures.  
Putnam argued that we should think of policy-makers as playing two games, a 
“Level I” international game with one another and a “Level II” ratification game with 
domestic constituencies. Both the likelihood of cooperation, and the distribution of gains 
when cooperation occurs, depends on each executive’s success in playing these two 
games simultaneously. 
Putnam’s point of reference was clearly the United States, in which an elected 
President negotiates treaties subject to approval by a two-thirds majority of an 
independently elected Senate. Extending it to parliamentary systems in which the 
parliament chooses the executive raises significant challenges, not always recognized 
(see Pahre 1997). Organized interest groups, which also play a role in the United States 
different than their role in many other democracies, have provided an important focus for 
many studies of “informal” ratification as well as studies of how interest groups influence 
legislative ratification (i.e. Crombez 2002; Milner 1997). 
The European Union has proved to be a fruitful subject for this kind of two-level 
analysis (Hug and Konig 2002; Konig and Hug 2000; Konig and Poter 2001; Milner 
1997: Chapter 8; Moyer 1993; Pahre 1997, 2001; Schneider 1993, 2000; Schneider and 
Cederman 1994). Timing probably explains part of this success, since the European 
Union’s straddling of international and domestic politics fits traditional academic 
boundaries rather poorly. The complexity of the multilevel process in the European 
Union also called out for an analytical framework capable of handling interactions 
between distinct political realms (cf. Konig et al., eds. 1996)  
Two-level studies tend to focus either on the interstate negotiation phase (Level I) 
or the domestic approval phase (Level II), though studies of either type naturally exploit 
the interactive and synergistic strengths inherent in the two-level framework. Aside from 
contributors to the Double-Edged Diplomacy project (Evans et al. Eds. 1993), which 
mostly emphasized the Level I game, the Level II game has attracted the most attention in 
European Union studies. Scholars have applied the Level II ratification game to the 
European Union in two ways. One group, best exemplified by a series of papers by 
Simong Hug, Thomas Konig, and others (Hug and Konig 1999; Konig and Hug 2000; 
Konig and Poter 2001), represents efforts to determine exactly who veto players are, 
under exactly what rules, in particular countries at particular times.  
A second group uses Level II ratification more loosely to examine domestic 
constraints on political action. For example, Helen Milner (1997: Chapter 8) uses a 
ratification model to examine ratification of the Maastricht treaty in Britain, France, and 
Germany, though ratification was not formally required in any of the three. In this respect 
her study resembles many others, examining a range of countries, that treat domestic 
groups as exercising informal influence over the preferences of negotiators (i.e. Evans 
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1993; Kahler 1993; Lehman and McCoy 1992; Martin and Sikkink 1993; Putnam 1988; 
Rapkin and George 1993; Schoppa 1997; Solingen 1993).  
Current theory treats all these forms of domestic approval as essentially similar, in 
which domestic actors “ratify” decisions negotiated by foreign policy makers. Virtually 
all of these treat the domestic political game as a ratification problem in which the 
government must receive some actor’s formal approval before an intergovernmental 
agreement takes effect. The literature notes a distinction in principle between formal 
ratification and more informal forms of approval, but threats them as analytically similar.  
This paper presents two related models that make a clear analytic distinction 
between formal and informal ratification. Formal ratification presents some decision-
makers with a dichotomous strategy space, giving them the choice of either accepting or 
rejecting a treaty. This results in discontinuities in the choices of other actors. 
Specifically, an executive need only make concessions to a legislature or other ratifier if 
an agreement’s passage would otherwise be in doubt. 
Informal ratification produces a continuous strategy space. Public opinion, 
interest groups, and other “ratifiers” may make slight changes in their support of the 
executive in response to small changes in the agreement. As a result, executives will 
make concession to informal ratifiers throughout the entire range of political support, and 
not just when an agreement is in danger of rejection. 
This institution difference plays a critical role: wit the same actors and identical 
preferences, agreement may be possible under informal ratification but impossible under 
formal ratification. The institutional difference also has behavioral implications for how a 
negotiator will view her domestic political problem, and how she will change agreements 
in response. 
Though I emphasize the differences between formal and informal ratification, 
certainly many executives face both problems. A legislature may have formal ratification 
authority over a treaty, while an executive may also worry about public opinion’s 
informal reactions in advance of parliamentary elections. The analysis here allows a 
straightforward synthesis of the two problems.  
As the forgoing discussion suggests, this paper is purely analytical and 
theoretical, without a systemic effort to test the theory. The goal is to provide 
propositions about formal and informal ratification games in a format that could be tested 
empirically, either quantitatively or in case studies. I also emphasize those propositions 
that distinguish the two games from each other. 
 
Framework for formal analysis 
 
 To model institution differences, it is helpful to have a very simple, flexible 
model of two-level games. For this, I assume that governments jointly choose a point 
(“policy”) in n-dimensional policy space. As in other spatial models, each actor has an 
ideal point, which represents that actor’s most-preferred point in the policy space. 
Governments may have preferences over policy that differ from society’s preferences. 
Each actor evaluates policy by their distance from her ideal. The models here use a 
quadratic loss function in which utility goes down with the square of the distance 
between an actor’s ideal point and the point being evaluated. 
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 The solution concept is the win-set, the set of points that are possible outcomes of 
the bargaining game between the governments when they take ratification needs into 
account. At times I will also analyze the “intergovernmental win-set,” the set of points 
that the governments might choose if no ratification were required. Because Putnam did 
not clearly distinguish executive and ratifier preferences, both definitions differ slightly 
from his, though my definitions are broadly consistent with the rest of the formal 
literature. Within the win-sets, I do not solve the obvious bargaining problem, but assume 
that any point within that set may be the result of negotiations (see Hammond and Prins 
1999 for a similar approach). 
 This paper is limited to games of complete information in order to highlight 
institutional differences. Complete information is also more tractable, and models of 
complete information provide an essential prelude to the study of incomplete information. 
We can only argue that incomplete information uniquely explains ratification failures, for 
instance, if we know whether ratification failures occur under complete information (for 
information in two-level games, see Iida 1993; Milner 1997; Milner and Rosendorff 
1996; for a similar type of problem in the EU, see Crombez 2002). Extending the model 
here to problems of incomplete information would provide a reasonable direction for a 
research agenda into informal ratification. 
 
The formal ratification game 
 
 The two-level game that attracted most of Putnam’s attention was a game in 
which two governments negotiate an international agreement, subject to ratification by 
one or more domestic actors. In the canonical case, an agreement will be ratified if it 
satisfies the median voter in the legislature. As Putnam forcefully argued, anticipation of 
the ratification stage has important effects on the intergovernmental negotiations.  
 This game has several applications to the European Union. At the Union level, the 
assent procedure, which gives the European Parliament the power to accept or reject 
legislation (without amendment) fits this game well. At the national level, legislatures’ 
ratification of major treaties, such as Maastricht or Nice, or the accession of new 
members is also well described by this game. Rather than explore particular applications 
of these procedures, this section will examine the general case in the abstract.  
 As this suggests, the exact identity of the “government” and “ratifier” may vary 
considerably in the EU. Most commonly, the Commission will be the “government” that 
negotiates an agreement with outsiders, though the Council formally negotiates with 
outsiders in accession and negotiates internally in the case of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The ratifier may be the Council in some cases, is the European 
Parliament in many other cases, and often includes national parliaments. Excluding 
amendment powers does not do too much violence to these procedures. For example, the 
European Parliament has only restricted amendment powers in the cooperation procedure 
(Tsebelis 1994, 1996), and (more controversially) may have no amendment powers at all 
in the codecision procedure (Pollack 1999; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Crombez 2002). 
As these illustrations show, the model applies when there is no single agenda-setter such 
as the European Commission, but two or more negotiators who jointly set the policy 
agenda for actors moving later in a given legislative process. 
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GAME 1: 
The Formal Ratification Game 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above box describes such a game. After the governments agree, some 
domestic group describes whether to ratify the agreement. If the governments cannot 
agree, or if ratification fails, the status quo ante remains. 
Policy is a point x ⊂ ℜm, with status quo Q at xQ. 
 
Actors are Governments A, B, and Ratifier R, with ideal points in n-
dimensional space xA, xB , xR. Ideal points are distinct from each other and 
from the status quo, so that xi ≠ xj, ∀i, j ∈ {A, B, R} and xi ≠ xSQ, ∀i, ∈ {A, 
B, R}. 
 
Outcome at end of game is xE, which will be either Q at xQ or a negotiated 
and ratified agreement N at xN. Label the set of all negotiable and ratifiable 
xN the “win-set,” w. I allow only “meaningful “ agreements, i.e. xN ≠ xQ. 
 
Utility is a quadratic loss function from ideal point, i.e. Ui(xE) = - [d(xi – 
xE)]2, i ∈ {A, B, R}, xE ∈ {xQ, w}. Actor i’s acceptance set ci = {x: d(xi – 
xQ) ≥ d(xi – xE)} 
 
Stages and outcomes: 
I. Negotiation along contract curve (Putnam’s Level I). A and B 
jointly choose a point xN. If either prefers xQ to xN, then xQ results 
and the game ends.  
 
 
II. Ratification by R (Putnam’s Level II). R ratifies xN iff it prefers 
xN to xQ. If it ratifies, outcome is xN; else xQ results. There is no 
amendment at the ratification stage. 
 
Structure of the game is complete information, and all of the above is 
common knowledge. 
 
Solution: if cA ∩ cB ∩ cR = ∅, then w = ∅; 
  else if cA ∩ cB ∩ cR = cA ∩ cB, then w = cA ∩ cB ∩ sAB; 
  else if cA ∩ cB ∩ cR ∩ wG= ∅, then w ⊂ wG; 
  else, then w ≠ ∅ and w ∩ wG = ∅. 
 Figure 1 shows the outcome of this game if there were no ratifier. This 
intergovernmental win-set consists of those points that are both negotiable and efficient. 
Those points that both governments would accept as alternatives to the status quo, 
because they are closer to their idea point than is the status quo, are negotiable. The 
contract curve between the two governments’ ideal points is efficient, for there is always 
some point on the contract curve that both governments prefer to any given point off the 
curve. The figure shows the two ways that an intergovernmental win-set may be bound,  
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either by an actor’s acceptance set (as B bounds the left end) or by a government’s ideal 
point. With different locations of Q, the win-set could be bound on both sides by the two 
acceptance sets or by the two ideal points.  
 Much of the case study literature on two-level games acts as if ratifiers are always 
constraining. However, adding a ratifier may or may not produce a result that differs from 
the intergovernmental win-set: 
 
Hypothesis 1. There are four possible outcomes to the 
formal ratification game: 
1a. formal ratification may make any international 
agreement impossible; 
1b. formal ratification may be irrelevant because the ratifier 
will accept anything the executive might negotiate;  
1c. a formal ratifier may constrain the win-set, accepting 
some points the government would negotiate but rejecting 
others (which the governments will therefore no longer 
negotiate); 
1d. a formal ratifier may shift the win-set to points off the 
intergovernmental win-set. 
(See Proposition 1 in the Appendix for proof) 
  
The first case, which ratification prevents agreement, occurs when the governments can 
agree on some policy but the ratifier prefers the status quo to any such agreements. At the 
other extreme, formal ratification may be irrelevant because the ratifier will accept 
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anything that the governments negotiate. Third, the ratifier may constrain the win-set 
because it is willing to ratify only part of the contract curve between the two 
governments. Finally, the ratifier will accept anything may change the win-set: It will 
ratify nothing on the government’s contract curve, but will ratify some other points that 
both governments prefer to the status quo.  
 Figure 2 shows the four possibilities. When the ratifier is at R1, there is no point 
acceptable to all three actors. As a result, the win-set W1 is the status quo Q, and policy 
remains unchanged.  
 
 If we move R southwestward, the ratifier is now willing to accept some changes 
in the same direction that the two governments desire. The governments will propose 
points as far as possible from the status quo1, yielding the arc labeled as W2. This arc is 
bounded by the lines connecting A and Q (AQ) and B and Q (BQ). Continued movement 
of R2 moves the arc toward the intergovernmental win-set, and the growing arc will 
suddenly shrink to a point when it touches the AB line. 
 Further movement will increase the number of points on the intergovernmental 
win-set that the ratifier will accept. The win-set W2  shows this case, with the right-hand 
bound of the win-set the same distance from R3 as is the status quo Q. As the ratifier 
moves still further it will accept all of the points in the intergovernmental win-set. 
Finally, at R4, the win set W4 is the same as the intergovernmental win set. When this 
occurs, the ratifier is effectively irrelevant. 
                                                 
1 I have made no assumptions about which points the governments will propose. This 
particular state of affairs has sparked a debate between Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 
(2000, 2002) and Dai (2002) over the likely outcome in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining 
model. 
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 These are four, qualitatively-different outcomes, as the pictures of the win-sets 
suggest. At least under conditions of complete information, there are also sharp 
boundaries between these outcomes as a point becomes an arc, then a point and then 
grows into a line segment. I have drawn the four illustrative ratifiers on a line to make 
visible how linear and continuous changes in the ratifiers preferences bay have 
“discontinuous” and “non-linear” qualitative changes in the win set.  
 Especially when we consider the case labeled W4 in the figure, Hypothesis 1 also 
reminds us of the importance point that not all actors’ preferences will be constraining. 
This has long been noticed in some of the case study literature (i.e. Snyder 1993) but 
many others attribute outcomes to the “ratification” requirements of many domestic 
groups on a single issue, regardless of the formal institutional requirements or precise 
distribution of preferences (i.e. Lehman and McCoy 1992; Milner 1997; Chapters 7-8; 
Rapkin and George 1993 1993). 
 These are various conditions under which the ratifier will be irrelevant. The 
simplest conditions is that if A’s and B’s ideal points are both in the ratifier’s acceptance 
set, then the ratifier will ratify everything on the contract curve and will therefore be 
irrelevant (see λ 1 in appendix). This has important behavioral implications for the kind 
of ratification behavior we should observe. In the R2 case, the governments propose an 
agreement that is barely acceptable to the ratifier. This should mean that the agreement 
will be ratified by the narrowest possible margin. Narrowly satisfying the voters in 
Denmark’s second vote on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union would probably be 
an example of this. In the other cases with successful ratification (R3 and R4) margins will 
be larger than needed. This was the case for the other Maastricht ratifications, except 
perhaps for France. 
 In addition to ratification margins, the most easily behavior in this model is 
whether the governments successfully negotiate any agreement at all. No agreement is 
possible when the status quo Q lies inside the triangle defined by A, B, and R (see λ 2 in 
appendix). Inside this triangle, moving Q in any direction will make at least one actor 
better off while making at least one actor worse off. The actor harmed will refuse to 
negotiate or ratify an agreement on that point. As we will see, the “gridlock” conditions 
are very different in the informal ratification game. 
 In summary, the relative positions of the executives, ratifiers, and status quo are 
critical for the outcome of the formal ratification game. All of these conditions depend on 
the relative position of the status quo and the tree actors in multidimensional space. What 
matters in the formal ratification games is the same thing that matters in real estate: 
location, location, and location. The results of the game are often discontinuous and vary 
significantly on either side of a threshold. Behavioral implications appear in the 
ratification margins as well as whether (and how) a negotiator responds to the ratifier’s 
concerns. 
 
 
 
Informal Ratification: the role of audience costs 
 
 Formal ratification often is not required for international agreements to take 
effect. When domestic actors do not have ratification authority, they may try to stop 
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undesirable agreements by inflicting costs on any government that signs them. For 
instance, the farm lobby in France, the Us, and Japan – none of which have a formal veto 
over policy – all tried to stop the GATT Uruguay Round through lobbying, street 
demonstrations, or campaign contributions (Avery, ed. 1993) Other groups throughout 
Europe mobilized over the Maastricht, Amsterdam, or Nice treaties. In one way or 
another, these activities impose some electoral costs on the government.2 
 Groups may inflict costs on negotiators directly. The public also inflicts costs 
indirectly, as when a policy lowers public support for the government. This might occur 
because the public can anticipate the likely benefits or costs of a given policy for them 
(i.e., Gabel 1998) or because the negotiators have chosen an open process that encourages 
public participation, as in the Amsterdam intergovernmental council. (Sverdrup, 1998) or 
the European constitutional convention (http://european-convention.eu.int) 
 These are “audience costs,” to use a term from the study of the effects of domestic 
politics on crisis decision-making and sanctions (Martin 199; Fearon 1994). The domestic 
audience costs increase as the agreement gets farther away from the domestic actor’s 
ideal point. These costs may be relatively important to the government or relatively 
unimportant, a factor that we may capture with a weighting parameter. These costs are, 
then, a function of the distance between the agreement and the ideal point of each 
relevant citizen or group. 
 Governments also have their own preferences over policy, so the distance 
between the agreement and the government’s ideal point is also important. Governments 
will only accept an international agreement in their acceptance set, the set of points that 
they prefer to the status quo, when they consider both their own policy preferences and 
the domestic costs of a policy. 
 In effect, then, a government in the informal ratification game has a transformed 
utility function in which it considers both its own preferences over policy a weighting of 
domestic groups’ preferences over policy. For simplicity, I will analyze the case with a 
single group, though obviously a country has many groups interested in a given decision. 
The government weights its own policy preferences α, and the group’s preferences (1-α), 
with α ∈ [0, 1]. 
 The adjacent box describes this game. Defining the win-set in this game requires 
first that we define the core, the set of points that cannot be changed if they are the status 
quo. We may describe the boundaries of the core by finding two lines, the alpha-line and 
the beta-line. The beta-line is simply the projection of B’s ideal point onto the line 
connecting A’s ideal point with G’s ideal point. As drawn in Figure 3, this projection lies 
inside the ABG triangle, but it could also lie outside the triangle. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 I am setting aside the role of information transmission by groups, a process analyzed by 
Crombez (2002). 
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GAME 2: 
Informal Ratification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Policy is a point x ⊂ ℜm, with status quo Q at xQ. 
 
Actors are Governments A, B with ideal points xA, xB, and domestic actor G in A 
with ideal point xG.  
 
Utility Government A’s utility depends on its own preferences and on the distance 
between outcome and the ideal points of that government’s public. I will use a 
quadratic loss function for the utility function. 
 
Specifically, for an end of the game outcome E at point xE ∈ {xQ, w}, A’s utility is 
UA = α[ d(xE, xA)]2 – (1 - α)[d(xE, xG)]2, where α ∈ [0, 1]. B’s utility is simply UB 
= [d(xE, xB)]2. 
 
Acceptance Sets: The acceptance set for A, cA, is the set of points that A strictly 
prefers to xSQ; cA = {xE: α[ d(xE, xA)]2 – (1 - α)[d(xE, xG)]2 <  α[ d(xQ, xA)]2 – (1 - 
α)[d(xQ, xG)]2}. B’s acceptance set cB = {xE: [d(xE, xB)]2 <  [ d(xQ, xB)]2} 
 
Stages and Outcomes: A and B choose a point xN from the win-set ≡ cA ∩ cB. I 
do not model how they choose this point. If w = ∅, xE = xQ. 
 
The game is complete information and all of the above is common knowledge. 
 
Solution is described in Proposition 3 in the Appendix. 
The alpha-line is defined by the fraction α. The line is perpendicular to the AG 
line, and intersects the AG line at a point that is the fraction α from A on the way to G. 
This point is also the point that maximizes A’s transformed utility function. The points on 
the alpha-line maximize A’s utility for each imaginary line parallel to the AG line. 
 With these definitions in mind, we can now define the core: 
 
 Proposition 2. The core in the informal ratification game is the subset of the  
 triangle  xAxGxB defined by the alpha-line and the beta-line. 
 
Specifically, the core is the shaded area in the adjacent figure between these two lines. 
 The logic of this result rests on the fact that A and G are no longer distinct actors 
who can veto an agreement that they do not like. This veto power is what prevents 
change inside the ABG triangle in the formal ratification game. Instead, only A and G are 
actors, though G’s preferences shape A’s evaluation of any agreement. If we consider a 
point in the ABβ triangle, both A and B would be better off moving this agreement due 
left onto the beta –line. Such a movement is closer to B’s ideal point and also closer to 
the alpha-line that captures (in a loose sense) A’s payoff when it considers G’s 
preferences as well. Similarly, any point in the left-hand unshaded triangle region could 
be shifted to the right onto the alpha-line and make both A and B better off.  
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 Between the alpha-line and the beta-line, any rightward movement making B 
better off makes A worse off by moving away from the alpha-line. Any leftward 
movement clearly makes B worse off. The points in this trapezoid are therefore Pareto-
efficient. If the status quo lies in this region it cannot be changed. 
 We may think of this core as analogous to the contract curve in the formal 
ratification game. It defines efficient points but we have not yet considered the location 
of the status quo. As in the formal ratification game, the governments may not prefer all 
points in the core to the status quo. This means that: 
 
 Proposition 3. The win-set of the informal ratification game is the intersection of 
 The core, cA, and cB. 
 
 The adjacent figure shows one such win-sets, in which B’s acceptance set is 
constraining. The result is shaped like a wedge in this cae, though other more unusual 
shapes are also possible. I should note here that A’s transformed win-set is not circular 
and is, in fact, difficult to characterize visually across the full range of possible ideal 
points. 
 This simple example shows the importance of distinguishing formal and informal 
ratification. Under formal ratification, change is impossible if the status quo lies inside 
the triangle defined by A, B, and R (λ2, Appendix). Under informal ratification, slices of 
that triangle are now open to negotiation. As a result, there are many situations in which 
no agreement will occur under formal ratification and agreement is possible under 
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informal ratification rules. Phrased differently, stalemates are more common under 
formal ratification than informal ratification.3  
 
 When the status quo Q is close to both A and B, the win-set is highly constrained 
in both games. Neither A nor B will accept much movement in policy, so little movement 
occurs. When the status quo becomes more distant, many point agreement are possible. 
As the set of possible agreements opens up, the procedures matter more and more. When 
the status quo is so distant that the government’s and ratifiers acceptance sets do not 
constrain, for example, the win-set is the entire AB line in the formal ratification game, 
but a slice of the ABG triangle in the informal ratification game. These two win-sets will 
not normally intersect at all, so that agreements possible under informal ratification are 
not equilibria under formal ratification, and vice versa. 
 Behaviorally, informal ratification games will be characterized by the negotiator 
“tacking” in the direction of domestic preferences. In Figures 3-4 above, for example, 
government A does not negotiate along the AB contract curve that we saw in the 
intergovernmental win-set (Figure 1). Instead, A negotiates with B over a set of points 
that goes part way to satisfying its own domestic constituencies. Qualitative study of the 
negotiation history in any area should uncover these partial concessions to domestic 
audiences. 
 These concessions to domestic interests are continuous, and are a continuous 
function of the weighting parameter (α) and the distance between the actors. In the 
                                                 
3 The analysis generalizes to n actors; the more ratifiers, the less likely agreement will be. 
This conclusion has been applied to decision-making in the European Union, both 
formally and informally (see Crombez 1996, 1997; Moyer 1993; Tsebelis 1995, 1999). 
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formal ratification game, once the ratifier will vote for an agreement the negotiators can 
ignore its preferences. In contrast, the informal ratification process continues to impose 
costs on negotiators if the ratifiers preferences are not considered. The informal 
ratification game also lacks the qualitative change between types of win-sets found in the 
formal ratification game. 
 Finally, the informal ratification game also lets us examine the many cases in 
which both informal and formal ratification is found. For example, a legislature may 
ratify a treaty that the prime minister negotiates while backbenchers also inflict some 
political cost on the prime minister for agreements away from their own ideal point. 
These situations are especially evident in foreign trade policy making (Jackson, et. al eds. 
1984; Meunier 2000), where internal EU decision-making processes, ratification of final 
agreements domestically, and the audience costs inflicted by a mobilized public all play a 
role. 
 
 For simplicity, I will assume that the same group has both formal and informal 
ratification powers. I will not modify it formally here, as it raises no new analytical 
issues. This synthetic game simply adds the ratifier’s constraint – its acceptance set – to 
the core as defined in this section. Figure 5 illustrates this case, with G both acting as 
formal ratifier and inflicting audience costs in the informal ratification game. The win-set 
is where the circles centered on B and G intersect with each other and with the shaded 
region (A’s acceptance set is not constraining in this case). Adding a veto actor raises the 
possibility of greater gridlock than in the informal ratification case alone. It is interesting 
that policy-making in issue areas characterized by important formal and informal 
ratification processes, such as external trade relations, are among the most difficult in the 
EU. 
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Divided government under formal and informal ratification 
 
 The continuous nature of change under informal ratification, as opposed to the 
discontinuous and qualitative changes found under formal ratification, shapes how these 
games work when applied to particular kinds of research problems. I will illustrate this 
briefly by examining the question of “divided government,” which has gained increasing 
attention within formal models of two-level theory. Divided government is the extend to 
which the executive’s preferences diverge from the legislature’s preferences in a given 
country (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Fiorina 1992; Krehbiel 1996; Laver and Shepsle 
1991; Mayhew 1991; O’Halloran 1994), or in our terms, the distance between the 
negotiator’s and the ratifier’s ideal points. 
 The literature has explored two distinct effects of divided government on 
international cooperation. First, increasing divided government can make cooperation 
more difficult or impossible because the ratifier will reject some treaties that the 
negotiator favors (i.e. Hammond and Prins, 1998; Iida 1993; Milner 1997; Milner and 
Rosendorff 1997, 1998; Mo 1994; 1995; Schneider and Cedermann 1994, but Karol 
2000; Pahre 2001).4 Trying to satisfy an unpredictable legislature under uncertainty may 
also force an executive to maintain a hardline stance abroad, preventing cooperation with 
foreigners (Milner 1997). In parliamentary systems, anticipated votes of no-confidence 
may play an analogous role to treaty ratification (Smith and Hayes 1997). 
 The second effect of divided government concerns the distribution of gains of 
cooperation, and goes by the name of the “Schelling Conjecture.” In Strategy and 
Conflict, Thomas Schelling (1961: 19-23) conjectured that an executive whose hands 
were tied would be able to negotiate more favorable outcomes than an unconstrained 
executive. For example, the president may successfully make demands of Japan in trade 
negotiations, reminding his interlocutors that he must satisfy a hardline Congress if any 
bargain will stick. A substantial formal literature has grown up around this claim Iiida 
1993, 1996; Milner and Rosendorff 1997; Mo 1994, 1995; Pahre 1997; Schneider and 
Cedermann 1994). Sophie Meunier (2000) has argued that the European Union has also 
received distributed gains from having veto players in some issue areas. 
 Whereas the veto player hypothesis addresses the probability of cooperation, the 
Schelling Conjecture concerns the distribution of the gains from cooperation. It therefore 
has only conditional validity in the formal ratification game, since it requires that 
cooperation has in fact occurred. We can analyze the role of divided government within 
the games of formal and informal ratification modeled here. It is now well-appreciated in 
the formal ratification game that analysts must clarify that the effects of divided 
government depend on the direction of the divisions. In Figure 2, for example, moving R4 
further to the southwest would increase divided government but have no effect on the 
game, while moving R3 or R2 to the northeast will increase divided government and have 
significant effects on the win-set. However, in either direction divided government has no 
                                                 
4 The argument parallels the analysis of veto players in domestic politics, especially in 
federal, presidential, and/or bicameral polities where several actors must approve any 
legislation (Brauninger and Konig 1999; Krehbiel 1996; Tsebelis 1995, 1999; Tsebelis 
and Money 1997). 
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effect beyond some threshold – either the ratifier rejects everything or accepts everything 
as its preferences become sufficiently different. 
 Once again, the informal ratification game is different because the ratifier exhibits 
continual pressure on the negotiator. In any direction, increasing divided government 
moves the alpha-line farther away from A’s ideal point and therefore expands the win-set. 
Divided government has unconditional validity in the informal ratification game, unlike 
the conditional validity found in the Schelling case. The government will have to make 
greater concessions to satisfy an increasingly distant informal ratifier. Increasing 
divisions between the executive and its domestic audiences will be associated with much 
more tacking in the direction of these audiences, and more terms will be inserted in the 
agreement for the benefit of these audiences. 
 In short, divided government does not affect the probability of cooperation under 
informal ratification, though it often does under formal ratification. Beyond some 
threshold, divided government does not affect the distribution of gains under formal 
ratification, but will always affect the distribution of gains under informal ratification. 
The two forms of ratification differ dramatically and cannot be lumped together as a 
single process. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Institutions vary dramatically across nations, across issue areas, and over time. 
The complexity of institutional rules is especially obvious in the European Union. Rather 
than examine this institutional variety, which has been explored elsewhere (i.e. Garett 
and Tsebelis 1996; Tsebelis and Garett 2000), this paper has added the study of 
uninstitutionalized informal ratification to the two-level negotiation problem. This kind 
of policy-making still dominates the second and third pillars of the European Union. 
 Informal ratification is particularly important for the European Union because the 
public’s control over policy is particularly indirect if it exists at all, exercised through 
delegates of delegates and their delegates. The Commission, for example, is chose by the 
national governments acting in the European Council, while those national governments 
are chose by national legislatures that are themselves chosen by the electorate. Neither 
public nor legislature has an effective veto over many decisions, and this is one of the 
features of the EU’s alleged democratic deficit. However, legislatures and electorates do 
have the ability to make their displeasure known and to impose costs on governments that 
act contrary to their wishes. 
 Audience costs may well be the most important – indeed the only – democratic 
constraint available in issue areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
CFSP positions and decisions are negotiated by the Council without being subject to 
formal ratification by other institutions. However, foreign policy decisions from Kosovo 
to Iraq have entailed substantial audience costs, and even more narrow joint positions 
such as voting in the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may have 
costs among a smaller audience. The “democratic deficit” characterizing these issues may 
be less than it seems if informal ratification plays an effective role in shaping 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
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 These issues have traditionally not played an important role in theorizing about 
the EU, especially in contrast to highly-institutionalized procedures such as cooperation 
or codecision. The academic debate over intergovernmentalism (Hosli 1993, 1995, 1996; 
Moravcsik 1996; Moser 1996ab; Tsebelis 1994, 1996) has hinged on the question of 
formal rules and not informal processes. Brining informal domestic political processes 
into the theory enriches intergovernmentalism while also expanding the theoretical reach 
of institutionalism. This agenda may produce some hypotheses that help us evaluate the 
relative contributions of intergovernmentalism and institutionalism for our understanding 
of the European Union. 
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APPENDIX:  FORMAL PROPOSITIONS AND PROOFS 
 
FORMAL RATIFICATION. 
 
See Game 1 for structure of the game.  
 
Additional Notation. Distinguish the intergovernmental win-set wG (the win-set if there 
were no ratifier) and the win-set w. Note that wG = cA ∩ cB ∩ xAxB; while a necessary 
condition for any xN to be a member of w is that xN ∈ {cA ∩ cB ∩ cR}, w will be the set 
of points that are Pareto-efficient for A and B within this set. 
 
Propostion 1. The solution of the formal ratification game may be described as follows:  
(a) if cA ∩ cB ∩ cR = ∅, then w = ∅; 
(b) else if cA ∩ cB ∩ cR = cA ∩ cB, then w = cA ∩ cB ∩ xAxB; 
(c) else if cA ∩ cB ∩ cR ∩ wG ≠ ∅, then w ⊂ wG; 
(d) else, then w ≠ ∅ and w ∩ wG ≠ ∅ 
 
Proof. Each i ∈ {A, B, R} must prefer N to SQ and (1) defines the conditions under 
which there is no such N. If R will ratify all points in wG, as described in (2), then 
ratification is irrelevant and w = wG. If R will ratify some but not all points in wG, as 
described in (3), then A and B will choose some point in wG ∩ cR; clearly w = wG ∩ cR ⊂ 
wG. Note that if A and B were to choose some xN ∉ wG, then the projection of xN onto 
xAxB is Pareto superior to xN. When cA ∩ cB ∩ cR ≠ ∅ and wG  ∩ cR = ∅, then there are 
ratifiable points that A and B prefer to xSQ but no such point lies on xA xB. Thus, A and B 
choose some xN : xN ∉ cR and xN ∉ wG. QED 
 
λ1. If xA, xB ∉ cR then ratification is irrelevant. 
 
Proof. Because R has convex preferences, when xA  and xB are in its acceptance set the 
convex combination of xA and xB (that is, xA xB) also lies entirely within its acceptance 
set and will be ratified. QED 
 
λ2. If xSQ is in the triangle xAxBxR and on the plane defined by xAxBxR , then no ratifiable 
agreement is possible (w = ∅) 
 
Proof. This triangle defines the simplex of Pareto-efficient points for A, B, and R, such 
that any agreement increasing the utility of both A and B must by definition reduce R’s 
utility. QED 
 
INFORMAL RATIFICATION 
 
  Notation. I will treat any point xi as a vector in n-dimensional space [xi1, xi2, xi3,…, xiN], 
or for simplicity[xi]. 
 
λ3. A’s utility is at a maximum at [xm] = [xA] + (1-α)[xG] 
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 Proof. Define a line L with origin at xA through xG and scaled such that xG = 1. The point 
[xm] must lie on L in the interval [0, 1] because for any other point x* there is a projection 
of x* onto L that reduces both d(x*, xA) and d(x*, xG) and therefore increases UA; if that 
projection xP lies outside [0,1], then either xA or xG will reduce both xA and xG, again 
increasing UA. A’s utility for any point x on L in [0,1] is UA = -αx2 – (1 - α)(1- x) 2. This 
function is at a maximum at (1 - α), which we may also describe as  [xA] + (1-α)[xG]. 
QED 
 
λ4. Point’s outside the triangle xAxGxB are not Pareto efficient. 
 
Proof. For any point x outside xAxGxB there is a projection of xP of x onto one of the three 
line segments bounding xAxGxB such that d(xP, xi) < d(x, xi) ∀i ∈ {A, G, B}; therefore 
UA(xP) > UA(x) and UB(xP) > UB(x). QED. 
 
λ5. On the xAxGxB plane, the set of points off the line xAxG that maximizes UA is 
described by the line perpendicular to xAxG through (1-α) =  [xA] + (1-α)[xG]. (Define 
this as the alpha-line.) 
 
Proof. Define a line Y parallel to L at distance y. Let xY be the point on Y that maximizes 
UA, and let xZ be the projection of xY onto L. Define z = d(xZ, xA) and therefore (1-z) = 
d(xZ, xG). This means that d(xY, xA) = sqrt(z2 + y2) and d(xY, xG) = sqrt((1 - z2) + y2), so 
that UA =  (z2 + y2) + ((1 - z2) + y2). The function UA is at a maximum when z = (1-α). 
QED. 
 
Definition. The beta-line is the line connecting xB, with xB*, the projection of xB onto the 
line xBxG. 
 
λ6. At any point outside the space defined by alpha-line and beta-line and inside the 
triangle xAxGxB is not Pareto-efficient. 
 
Proof. Any point x* inside the triangle xAxGxB defines a line Y* parallel to the line xAxG. 
Points on Y* between the alpha-line and beta-line are Pareto efficient because movement 
toward the alpha-line implies movement away from the beta-line, which necessarily 
increases the distance to xB. Movement on Y* toward the beta-line implies movement 
away from the alpha-line and therefore reduces A’s utility. If x* is outside these lines, 
movement toward both lines raises A’s and B’s utility simultaneously. QED. 
 
Definition. The core is the set of points that cannot be changed if they are the status quo. 
 
Proposition 2.The core in informal ratification games is a subset of the triangle xAxGxB 
defined by the alpha-line and the beta-line. 
 
Proof. Follows from the above lemmas. QED. 
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Proposition 3. The win-set of the informal ratification game is the intersection of the 
core, cA, and cB. 
 
Proof. Follows from Proposition 2 and the definition of acceptance sets. 
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